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WHAT IS THE “SOCIAL” IN “SOCIAL 
COHERENCE?” COMMENTARY ON NELSON 
TEBBE’S RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN 
EGALITARIAN AGE 
BY PATRICIA MARINO 
  It is my pleasure to comment on Nelson Tebbe’s deep and 
engaging book. In addition to its careful legal analysis, Religious 
Freedom in an Egalitarian Age1 bears on important philosophical 
issues concerning values, moral reasoning and the justification of 
evaluative beliefs. I find these issues especially interesting 
because I’ve engaged with some of them myself. Methodologically, 
Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age2 makes use of a concept 
of social coherence, and my work also considers questions of how 
coherence functions in evaluative contexts. What does it mean for 
our value judgments to fit together in an appropriate way? How 
can we use coherence to discover and justify evaluative beliefs? 
How is coherence related to agreement and disagreement, and 
what are the limits of coherence approaches? In my recent book, I 
consider these questions from a point of view that focuses 
specifically on moral judgments, and I argue for a perspective on 
“moral coherence” that has much in common with the “social 
coherence” model Professor Tebbe outlines.3 In this comment, I 
want to explore the ways in which that perspective both does and 
does not fit with the one Professor Tebbe develops throughout his 
legal analysis.  
 In framing my approach, I start from the idea that we value 
pluralistically, endorsing multiple values like benevolence, justice, 
liberty, and fidelity which can conflict and cause moral dilemmas. 
Coherence, in my view, does not require rejecting value pluralism 
 
  1 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017). 
2 Id. 
3 PATRICIA MARINO, MORAL REASONING IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD (2015). 
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or aiming toward single-principle theories like utilitarianism, in 
which the right action is always the one that brings about the most 
overall happiness or well-being. Instead, coherence requires 
finding principled compromises among conflicting values, and 
being “case consistent” -- which means judging morally similar 
cases similarly when there are no morally significant differences 
between them. Moral conflicts and difficult judgment calls are to 
be expected, and are not a sign of bad reasoning. I call my view of 
principled compromises and case consistency “pluralist 
coherence,” and I think people often appeal to something like it. 
For example, in the abortion debate, it is common to hear 
interlocutors accuse one another of being “inconsistent”: of not 
treating similar cases that are like one another in morally relevant 
features. 
 There are important points of agreement between our 
approaches, and I find many of Professor Tebbe’s particular claims 
to be important, justified, and under-appreciated. For example, too 
often in evaluative domains the idea of “coherence” is interpreted 
in a way that favors the pursuit of single principle theories -- the 
implication being, as Professor Tebbe says, that in the absence of 
moral absolutes, what we end up with is hopelessly arbitrary.4 I 
think Professor Tebbe is absolutely right to say that value 
conflicts, dilemmas, and uncertainty are compatible with 
appropriate forms of reasoning and justification, and that we do 
not need absolutism to say there are reasons in favor of one 
outcome over another. Also, Professor Tebbe is correct to 
emphasize the way that our judgments can be socially influenced 
yet still form apt starting points for evaluative reflection.5 This is 
because understanding what matters and why always requires an 
appeal to judgments, and those judgments are always formed in a 
social environment. That we must appeal to our judgment in 
deciding how to balance conflicting values does not make those 
decisions unjustified or ad hoc, since appealing to judgment is how 
we generally move forward in ethical thinking. 
 So there are obviously many opinions that Professor Tebbe 
and I share. But there are important differences between my 
“pluralist coherence” and Professor Tebbe’s “social coherence.” My 
 
4 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017). 
5 Id. 
MARINO, MACRO VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2018  10:24 AM 
2018 WHAT IS THE “SOCIAL” IN “SOCIAL COHERENCE?” 117 
approach is what Professor Tebbe calls “individualistic”: a person 
begins from a set of moral judgments and uses pluralist coherence 
to improve them.6 Whether those judgments are widely shared or 
socially accepted is not directly relevant to this process, since an 
individual’s views can be internally coherent, even if their moral 
beliefs differ radically from those shared by their community. In 
fact, from the point of view of pluralist coherence, there can be 
multiple sets of moral beliefs that are internally coherent yet 
disagree with one another.7  
 In my view, an important aspect of why there is so much 
moral disagreement and diversity has to do the fact that the way 
people value is pluralistic in two senses. First, there are the 
elements of “value pluralism” that I sketched above: we hold 
multiple, sometimes-conflicting values, ones that are not reducible 
to a single overarching value or a super-value.8 We value respect 
for individual persons and the collective good; we respect fidelity 
and honesty; we care about liberty, equality, and justice. These not 
only conflict in particular circumstances, but also seem to 
represent different kinds of goods and resist expression in terms 
of a single unifying value.9 Second, while we often share values, 
different people direct their cares at different objects and prioritize 
amongst them in different ways.10 For example, with respect to 
prioritization, some people may prize justice and fairness above 
all, overriding considerations related to the common good, while 
others who prioritize differently, allowing that in some cases, the 
collective good is most important. Overall, Americans are famous 
for valuing and prioritizing autonomy, even when the demands of 
respecting individual autonomy seem to conflict with other values 
such as benevolence.  
 As I see it, these pluralisms help explain some diversity in 
moral judgments. For example, in deciding whether it is 
appropriate to lie to protect a friend, a person who values honesty 
most may say no, while one who values loyalty most may say yes. 
And in the abortion debate, it is possible for people to value the 
potential life of a developing fetus, and also to value a woman’s 
 
6 Id. 
7 Id, 
8 PATRICIA MARINO, MORAL REASONING IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD (2015). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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autonomy rights to control her body, yet completely disagree about 
abortion, because those who prioritize the latter will be pro-choice 
and those who prioritize the former will not. This connection 
between diversity and conflict explains why so much moral 
disagreement seems to arise in the contexts of dilemmas, in which 
there is more than one value at stake, and as an individual we feel 
pulled in different directions.  
 From this framing, it follows that moral disagreements can 
arise in two different ways. Sometimes people roughly share 
values and prioritizations, but one person is failing to be case 
consistent -- that is,  to judge the same way those cases they 
themselves would see as similar in significant ways. This can 
occur, for example, because of the well-known phenomenon of 
framing effects, where we judge differently cases that are identical 
in all the facts, only because of the way the cases are presented 
and described. For instance, sometimes when a given tax policy is 
described in terms of exemptions, it is judged to be unfair, but 
when described in terms of benefits, it is judged to be fair -- and 
this is because of framing effects. Where our judgments are 
distorted by emotions, self-interest, and contextual influences, we 
fail to judge cases consistently, and this lead to the kinds of 
disagreements where one person is mistaken.11 In these cases, 
coherence reasoning can help us reach a consensus, by showing us 
how genuinely consistent moral theorizing would support some 
particular conclusion. 
 But in my view, disagreement can also arise for more 
fundamental reasons, arising from the way people direct and 
prioritize values differently on a deeper level.12 In the latter kind 
of situation, disagreement can be entrenched: even when both 
sides are reasoning consistently and well, deep differences in value 
prioritization means that they will never agree. For the person 
who prioritizes honesty over fidelity and the one who prioritizes 
fidelity over honesty, and for the people who prioritize autonomy 
rights and the value of a developing fetus differently, coherence 
will not lead to consensus or agreement. This is because, as we’ve 
seen, when people direct and prioritize values differently, there 
can be multiple internally coherent moral sets of beliefs. When 
 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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disagreements are due to deep differences in values and priorities, 
I think that arguments and reasoning run out: in these cases 
moral change happens through social and cultural changes, helped 
along through means like personal activism, art, and literature.13  
 As Professor Tebbe notes, from this kind of “individualistic” 
point of view, even morally abhorrent systems can be internally 
coherent:14 such systems, I argue, ought to be criticized on moral 
grounds rather than through charges of incoherence and 
irrationality. For example, defenders of slavery in the pre-Civil 
War American South may have been internally consistent; the 
problem is that their moral beliefs reflect a profoundly 
mistaken sense of what is just, right, and so on. In contrast, 
Professor Tebbe’s model of “social coherence” is meant to point us 
toward consensus.15 Social coherence tries to avoid the 
individualistic perspective on coherence, and emphasizes the 
possibility of shared reasoning, even in the face of entrenched 
disagreement. The idea, I take it, is that in the context of legal 
reasoning, we can find and appeal to a shared initial perspective 
to generate conclusions that we all must recognize as justified. 
Thus, the problem of multiple internally coherent systems that 
disagree with one another does not arise. 
 My main question here is how, exactly, this shared 
perspective should be understood. Who, exactly, is the “we” who 
shares it? At some points, Professor Tebbe uses phrases like 
“constitutional understandings”16 and “precedents and principles 
that are authoritative among contemporary American jurists.” 17 
This suggests what I would consider a more “formal” approach: 
social coherence means coherence with a set of specific texts and 
previous decisions. In other places, though, Professor Tebbe seems 
to move away from the formal approach, saying that we can appeal 
to “shared understandings,”18 and “[m]eanings that are deeply 
rooted and sufficiently widespread.”19 Giving the example of 
 
13 PATRICIA MARINO, MORAL REASONING IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD (2015). 
14 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 44. 
17 Id. at 43. 
18 Id. at 38. 
19 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE, 44 (2017). 
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marriage equality, he describes how we can change our system by 
“engaging in critique.”20 
 From the point of view of legal theory and practice, there is 
obviously much to be said for this kind of formal approach as a 
practical system for moving things forward. But from a broader 
evaluative point of view, it faces various well-known limitations -- 
some of which seem to make change and critique impossible. In its 
talk of specific texts and precedent, the formal approach risks 
inflexibility, conflating “coherence” with “consistency through 
time.” How could change happen? Furthermore, the formal 
approach makes the possibility of moral critique obscure. If 
opinions that are out of step with a set of texts and judicial 
decisions are simply “incoherent,” then how could changing values 
inform our legal decision making? 
 Consider the example of LGBTQ+ rights. Until very 
recently, in US culture the idea of acceptance for gays and lesbians 
was outside the scope of majority views. It seems to me that the 
change in perspective regarding these rights is particularly 
difficult to account for as an example of social coherence reasoning 
under the more formal approach. The formal interpretation would 
suggest that we came to see discrimination against LGBTQ+ 
people as inconsistent with longstanding principles, and 
homophobia as rationally incoherent with existing doctrine.  
 Is this interpretation, in terms of inconsistency with 
longstanding principles, apt? Let me suggest a different 
interpretation of that history -- one that, I’ll argue, is a better fit 
with the more individualistic understanding of coherence. In this 
alternative, it’s not that American homophobia was somehow 
rationally incoherent: it existed in a certain widely -- though 
obviously not universally -- shared culture and value system 
surrounding sexuality in general, one in which sex was only for 
married heterosexual people, and one that was informed by the 
idea that a woman’s sexuality fell under the purview of a man -- 
her father, husband, or some other man. But over time sexual 
values changed. As a result of complex social and cultural factors, 
sex came to be understood more through the lens of personal 
autonomy, and LGBTQ+ people engaged in highly effective 
activism that undercut homophobic sentiments and beliefs.  
 
20 Id. 
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 Legal theorist Rebecca Ryan’s 1995 essay on the history of 
the marital rape exception recounts a narrative that supports this 
kind of interpretation.21 Historically, marriage was thought to 
subsume the women’s will under that of her husband, but complex 
cultural value shifts put pressure on this idea.22 The rise of 
individualism more generally made dependency relations 
awkward to theorize, and once women were not seen as on a par 
with servants, it became impossible to deny that women have 
autonomy rights of their own. Forced sex came to be seen as a 
violation of those autonomy rights rather than as a mere violation 
of chastity.23 Once the norms shifted, the idea that marital rape is 
impossible did come to seem “incoherent”: it was inconsistent with 
the values expressed in other laws and social norms. Only then 
could feminists fight to have the contradiction resolved through a 
legal recognition that marital rape is rape. 
 Analogously, in this alternative explanation of LGBTQ+ 
rights, yes: once sexual values are understood in terms of personal 
autonomy rights, then yes, it does, in fact, become inconsistent to 
allow heterosexual people to have rights that gay people don’t 
have. That is, we can then say that legalized discrimination 
against LGBTQ+ people is “out of step with other fixed features of 
the constitutional system.”24 But I would say that it is out of step 
with a set of beliefs informed by a particular moral system, and 
one that is increasingly, though again not universally, shared. It’s 
not so much that we suddenly recognized that this form of 
discrimination was morally incoherent with foundational texts 
and had always been so, as the formal interpretation of the social 
coherence model would seem to suggest.  
 This way of understanding social change would suggest that 
we need the less formal interpretation of social coherence. In the 
less formal interpretation, we could appeal to the way that values 
shifted, to say that what may not have been incoherent in the past 
is now incoherent: to deny LGBTQ+ rights is inconsistent with the 
now common framing of sex in terms of autonomy rights, 
individual freedom, and consent. Indeed, there are several places 
 
21 REBECCA M. RYAN , A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION, 941-
1001 (1995). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE, 44 (2017). 
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in the book that seem to support this less formal interpretation, 
and several arguments that involve appeal to “intuitive” matters 
like what is harmful, what constitutes a trivial harm and what 
constitutes a serious one, and so on.25 In this interpretation, it’s 
not just foundational texts and legal decisions but also “shared” 
moral beliefs that are currently “deep” or “widespread.”26 This 
would allow for more of a role for morally shifting perspectives. 
 But this interpretation raises new and difficult questions. 
The main question is: what does it mean for a moral belief to be 
“shared” or “deep” or “widespread,” especially in a highly varied 
society like the US? This is, of course, a question as old as the hills, 
but let me draw out two specifically relevant aspects of it here. 
 First, the framing of the issues in terms of “social coherence” 
and especially this use of the term “coherence” risks the 
implication that people with values different from the US 
mainstream or majority are somehow “incoherent.” This seems to 
me a regrettable formulation. Many people endorse values that 
diverge from the mainstream in some way. For example, look at 
economic values. It’s become a kind of orthodoxy in contemporary 
United States to favor economic “growth” above all else. But as we 
are increasingly seeing, economic growth is compatible with 
skyrocketing inequality, as the rich get richer and everyone else 
gets poorer. Does this mean the person who favors increased 
equality is somehow incoherent? Or what about the libertarian, 
who favors economic liberty whether or not it promotes growth, 
just on grounds of liberty rights -- is that person “incoherent”? 
Before the last few decades, there was a widespread belief that 
same-sex activity was inherently bad, even if it was inherently 
bad. Does that mean early LGBTQ+ activists were “incoherent”? I 
would say that to label these people with the term “incoherent” 
wrongly suggests that they have a set of beliefs that is internally 
irrational or inconsistent, when in reality they do not. This 
delegitimates non-majority views. 
 A second specific and related point has to do with whose 
beliefs are thought to matter. Frankly, when I hear talk of “our 
shared perspective” I often have an instinctive feeling of worry. In 
the past “our shared perspective” has often been a way of saying 
 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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“the perspective of people who are white, male, and moneyed.” 
Together with the previous point, we see an especial danger—that 
views that are not only “minority” views in a statistical sense but 
also held by people who are relatively disenfranchised will be 
labeled “incoherent” and thus de-legitimated. Sometimes, as with 
early LGBTQ+ activists, these are the views that we ought to pay 
more attention to.  
 None of this shows that the social coherence model can’t be 
used for its intended purpose. But it does, in my opinion, highlight 
certain difficulties with it. First, the “social” in social coherence 
might be a problem. Evaluative critique often comes from those 
outside the mainstream, or from those who are disenfranchised, 
and for “social coherence” to ignore these views or treat them as 
“incoherent” in the sense of “irrational” or “impossible to 
understand” would be a mistake. Second, and partly for this 
reason, social coherence cannot replace, but rather must co-exist 
with a more individualistic theory of moral reasoning and 
judgment—one that we must draw on for a full accounting of why, 
exactly, one decision is better justified than another in cases of 
complexity and conflict. Finally, if I am right that some entrenched 
disagreements are ones that are based on deep value conflicts, and 
that in these cases it is possible to have multiple sets of beliefs that 
are internally coherent yet disagree with one another, this puts 
pressure on the question of how, exactly, the agreement of “social 
coherence” comes about. 
 
